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 3 
Section 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Pogge in his paper “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty” developed an idea 
for global institutional reform which contributed significantly to the debate about global 
justice and promotion of human rights. He is of the opinion that such ultimate goals as 
global justice and the fulfillment of human rights would be easier to achieve with a 
system that assumes a vertical dispersal of sovereignty (Pogge 1992, p. 48). He calls it 
“institutional cosmopolitanism” (or alternatively “institutionalism”). It is a system where 
individuals' loyalties and allegiance are dispersed among many different political units of 
various size, and where any political unit is dominant (p. 52).   
In his work, Pogge contrasts institutionalism to another cosmopolitan approach which 
he calls “interactional cosmopolitanism” (or alternatively “interactionalism”). From his 
paper, we can understand that the main difference between institutionalism and 
interactionalism lies in their view on the duties that human rights entail (p. 50-53). 
Interactionalism holds  individual and collective agents directly responsible for justice. 
Pogge's form of cosmopolitanism, by contrast, holds institutions and institutional 
schemes responsible for it, leaving individual and collective actors with indirect 
responsibility. In Pogge's view, his new approach would lead to a much stronger overall 
morality (p. 50).  
In order to justify institutional cosmopolitanism, Pogge attempts to use a strategy that 
would permit him to go beyond the debate between two extreme approaches to duties, 
namely libertarianism and utilitarianism. The idea is to invoke strong obligations on the 
part of individuals by appealing only to their negative duties and not affirming positive 
duties1. In this way, Pogge attempts to broaden the circle of responsibility for the 
fulfillment of human rights. However, Pogge attempts to do it in a way which seems to be 
                                                           
1
 As it will be explained further in my thesis, negative duties are duties to constrain actions that could 
cause harm to the rights of other individuals, positive duties are duties to help other individuals with the 
fulfillment of their human rights 
 4 
overly ambitious and almost impossible – to reconcile the libertarian and the utilitarian 
view on duties. The goal of my thesis is to discover how successful Pogge is in his 
strategy to do it.  
In my thesis, I will attempt to show that when Pogge addresses negative duties within 
his cosmopolitan approach  – his argumentation loses much of its normative appeal. My 
first critical argument is that institutional cosmopolitanism does not specify well enough 
the obligations that negative duties impose on individuals. This leads to a weakening of 
the position of institutionalism in the debate on human rights. My approach to show that 
the obligations are not well enough specified is to explore the way how institutionalism 
assumes the requirements that negative duties impose on individuals and compare its 
view on the duties with the view provided by another cosmopolitan approach – 
interactionalism. I will argue that the answer of institutionalism is very indeterminate and 
therefore weak, while the answer of interactionalism is clear and therefore more 
convincing than the answer of institutionalism.  
My second critical argument is that Pogge fails to address negative duties in his 
theory the way he wants to do it. I will attempt to show that the institutional view on the 
duties doesn’t distinguish much from the view of someone who assumes that we have 
both negative and positive duties, while Pogge tries not to affirm positive duties (1992, p. 
52).  
If I succeed in my argumentation, I will show that Pogge fails to reach his primary 
goal –  to provide strong arguments in favor of institutional cosmopolitanism and 
convince the reader that his approach to human rights leads to a much stronger overall 
morality (1992, p. 50). 
Serving the goal of my thesis, I have divided my thesis into six sections. The second 
section will lay out the conceptual framework that Pogge uses in his theory to develop his 
arguments in favor of institutional cosmopolitanism. In particular, I will explain the 
difference between the two extreme approaches to the individuals’ duties that human 
rights entail, namely libertarianism and utilitarianism. The third section will make you 
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familiar with Pogge’s institutional approach to the duties. I will explain how and why 
Pogge attempts to go beyond the debate between libertarians and utilitarians. In the fourth 
section of my thesis, I will lay out main objections to institutional cosmopolitanism. In 
the fifth section, I will make a suggestion for improvement of the theory by introducing 
“the Least Harm Principle” and show how it addresses the criticism to the theory. In the 
final section of my thesis, I will draw conclusions about how successful Pogge is in his 
attempt to reconcile the two extreme approaches to duties and conclude how well “The 
Least Harm Principle” responds to the criticism addressed to institutional 
cosmopolitanism.   
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Section 2 
 LIBERTARIAN AND UTILITARIAN CONCEPTS OF DUTIES 
2.1 Introduction 
This section will explain the conceptual framework that Pogge uses in his theory to 
develop his argument that supports institutional cosmopolitanism. The aim of Pogge, as 
we will lateron, is to go beyond the debate between two extreme views on duties that 
human rights entail, namely libertarianism and utilitarianism (Pogge, 1992, p. 51). In 
order to understand Pogge’s strategy to go beyond the debate, it is necessary to understand 
the conceptual difference between the two extreme views on duties.  
Libertarianism and Utilitarianism propose two conceptually different understandings 
of duties. The difference between a libertarian and a utilitarian position lies in their 
understanding of how far reaching individuals’ duties are. The utilitarian concept assumes 
that we have both negative and positive duties (Singer 1972, pp. 229-43, Shue 1980, 
Luban 1985, p. 209). Negative duties oblige us to avoid harming the rights of other 
individuals. Positive duties oblige us to assist other individuals with the fulfillment of 
their human rights. In contrast to the utilitarian concept, the libertarian concept assumes 
that we only have negative duties (Buchanan 2004, pp.195-201, Nozick 1974, pp. 160-
162).  This section of my thesis will explore both the utilitarian and the libertarian 
concept of duties and lay out how these concepts are being justified by their supporters.  
 
2.2 The Utilitarian Concept of Duties 
The utilitarian concept of duties assigns two types of duties to individuals: negative 
and positive duties (Pogge 2008, p. 70). Negative duties entail two obligations (Nees 
2010, p. 21). The first obligation requires us to restrict all our actions that could cause 
harm to human rights of other individuals. It is known as the “Harm-Avoidance 
Requirement”. The second obligation obliges us to compensate sufficiently the harm 
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caused by our actions to other individuals if we couldn’t avoid the harm. This obligation 
is known as the “Compensation Requirement”. In turn, positive duties entail an obligation 
to assist other individuals with the fulfilment of their human rights (Singer 1972, p. 232).  
The utilitarian view on duties was defended by numerous philosophers including 
Peter Singer (1972), David Luban (1985), and Henry Shue (1996). Unfortunately, I don’t 
have enough space in this thesis to explain all arguments that advocate the utilitarian 
concept of duties. Therefore, I will analyse only those arguments which seem to be the 
most convincing.  
The first argument belongs to Peter Singer who is convinced that if "it is in our power 
to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (1972, p. 231). To support this 
specific claim Singer develops his famous argument of a drowning child. To understand 
it, consider a situation: you see a drowning child in a pond and you can save him by 
diving into the water. But if you dive into the water, you will probably spoil your clothes. 
But if you don’t, the child will die. In this case, you are morally obliged to dive into the 
water and save the child, because the harm of the child (in this case the loss of his life) 
will by far outweigh your potential harm (the spoilt clothes)2. Thus, it is your positive 
duty to dive into the water. 
The other argument that supports the utilitarian view on duties comes from to Henry 
Shue (1996). In his argumentation he highlights the problem associated with a too sharp 
distinction between negative and positive duties. He assumes that a negative right often 
requires a positive action what he calls “negative refraining” (p. 39). For example, I have 
a negative right not to be killed. To secure my negative right, some positive preventive 
actions should be taken, such as the provision of police forces and a legal framework, that 
would secure my negative right not to be killed. Hence, it is very difficult to separate 
what we should understand under a negative right and a positive duty, because the former 
often requires the latter. The difference between the libertarian and the utilitarian position 
                                                           
2
 This is a “harm principle” described and justified by Peter Singer in his work “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality” (1972, 231) 
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regarding the argument of Shue essentially lies in their understanding of what Shue calls 
“positive preventive steps”. Positive preventive steps are steps that should be taken in 
order to prevent violations of human rights (Shue 1996, p. 39). Utilitarians assume that 
these steps also include the positive duties of individuals to aid and assist other 
individuals with the fulfilment of their rights (Shue 1996, pp. 36-65), while libertarians 
assume that these steps should be limited only to the preventive actions that directly 
restrain violation of human rights (Nozick 1974). 
 David Luban unveils the utilitarian position on human rights with these words, “A 
human right, then, will be a right whose beneficiaries are all humans and whose obligors 
are all humans in a position to effect the right” (1985, p. 209). In so far, as I understand it 
from the reading, utilitarians assume that all humans are in a position to be able to effect 
the rights of other individuals without having to have a causal relation with them. For 
example, you don’t have to have any specific relation with starving children in Africa to 
be held by utilitarians responsible for their death. Because, if you could help the starving 
children, but you didn’t, utilitarians assume that you are responsible for their death. In 
contrast to utilitarians, libertarians assume that the number of individuals that can effect a 
right of an individual is strictly limited to those who have a direct causal relation with 
that individual (see section 2.3).  
 
 
2.3 The Libertarian Concept of Duties 
The libertarian concept of duties denies that human rights entail any positive duties (to 
aid and assist other individuals with the fulfilment of their rights). Hence, they also reject 
the fundamental list of positive rights that utilitarians assume (e.g. a right for education, 
material security, healthcare, etc.; see Nozick 1974, Buchanan 2004). In contrast to 
utilitarians, libertarians limit an individuals’ responsibility only to actions that impose 
direct harm to human rights. Consequently, on a libertarian view, you cannot be 
responsible for the harm that has indirect relation to your actions. For example, following 
the libertarian view, you cannot be responsible for the death of an African child only 
because you hadn’t send five euro last month to a charity organization that supports 
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children in Africa. In fact, there is no direct causal relation between your action (or 
inaction) and the harm caused to the child.  
Further, following the libertarian view, human rights entail only negative duties. That 
is, first, to restrain your actions from harming the rights of other individuals. Second, to 
compensate the harm if you couldn’t avoid it  
The argument that advocates the libertarian view on duties can be found in the book 
of  Allen Buchanan “Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law”(2004). In his book Buchanan argues that we should separate the “duty 
of charity” from the “duty of justice” (p. 195-201). The former duty requires us to aid and 
assist welfare of other individuals, however, this is not what we “owe” people by the 
requirement of justice3. In other words, individuals do not have any rights for our charity, 
because justice doesn’t assign any charity-obligations to individuals.   
Another argument can be found in Nozick’s “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” (1974). In 
his work, Nozick has noted that the enforcement of positive rights will lead to permanent 
and unjustified interferences in personal life of individuals that are intuitively unjust (see 
Nozcik’s famous “Wilt Chamberlain” example, pp.160-162). In relation to this, however, 
the core problem is that positive duties do not include any clear obligations for the 
obligors, while clear and definite obligations, following libertarians, are indeed a 
necessary condition for something to be assumed as just (Nozick 1974, p. 162).            
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3
 Buchanan contrasts the “duty of charity” to the “duty of justice” by arguing that only the latter 
imposes some obligations of justice on individuals (Buchanan 2004, p. 195-201) 
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Section 3 
POGGE’S INSTITUTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section of my thesis, I have clarified the difference between the 
libertarian and the utilitarian concept of the duties that human rights impose on 
individuals. In this section, I will lay out the theory of “institutional cosmopolitanism”, or 
alternatively, “institutionalism.”  
Within the theory, Pogge develops a new understanding of human rights and, 
consequently, the duties that they entail. I will begin with the exploration of 
institutionalism and lay out how it can be distinguished from another cosmopolitan 
approach to human rights and the duties which Pogge calls “Interactional 
cosmopolitanism” (or alternatively, “interactionalism”). In this section of my thesis, I will 
also analyse what is Pogge’s specific reason to go beyond the libertarian-utilitarian debate 
about duties and what his strategy entail. In this context, I will also investigate the reasons 
for Pogge to offer his alternative to the interactionalism approach. 
 
3.2 Interactional Cosmopolitanism and Pogge’s Institutional Response  
In his article “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”, Pogge emphasises the difference 
between his “institutional cosmopolitanism” and what he calls “interactional 
cosmopolitanism” with the following words, 
 “Interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights 
to other (individual and collective) agents, whereas institutional cosmopolitanism assigns such 
responsibility to institutional schemes. On the latter view, the responsibility of persons is then 
indirect – a shared responsibility for the justice of any practices one support: one ought not to 
participate in an unjust institutional scheme (one that violates human rights) without making 
reasonable efforts to aid its victims and to promote institutional reform.” (1992, p. 50) 
As I understand it from the text, the main difference between the institutional and the 
interactional paradigm lies in their understanding of the responsibility that duties impose. 
For those who support interactional paradigm, irrespectively of whether they share the 
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utilitarian or the libertarian view on human rights and the duties, individuals are directly 
responsible for the fulfilment of human rights of other individuals. In other words, if you 
share the utilitarian or the libertarian position on duties, you fall automatically into the 
paradigm of interactional cosmopolitanism because you share the belief that individuals 
are directly responsible for the fulfilment of human rights.  
In general, libertarians share this belief because they assume that a direct causal 
relation between individual’s action and harm caused is a necessary condition to be able 
to impose some responsibility for his action on the individual. Utilitarians, in turn, share 
this belief because they assign direct responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to 
individual and collective actors “independently” of their causal relation with those whose 
rights should be fulfilled. In contrast to interactionalism, Pogge’s institutional 
cosmopolitanism suggests another approach to individuals’ responsibility for the 
fulfilment of human rights. Institutionalism holds institutions and institutional schemes 
directly responsible for the fulfilment of human rights and leaves individual and 
collective actors with only indirect responsibility. 
 Such a new approach to individuals’ responsibility regarding human rights includes a 
new, distinct from interactional, understanding of human rights and, consequently, the 
particular duties that they entail. Here, I will lay out both innovations of Pogge: his new 
concept of human rights, and his new concept of the duties that human rights entail.   
Pogge writes on his understanding of human rights, “Human rights, then, are moral 
claims on the organization of one’s society” (2008, p. 70). This is quite a new 
understanding of human rights that differs greatly from a traditional understanding of 
human rights that interactionalists assume. For interactionalists, human rights are a sort of 
moral rights that individuals possess by virtue of being a human (Nees 2010, p. 13). 
Interactional concept doesn’t tie human rights to institutions. Contrastingly, Pogge sees a 
direct relationship between human rights and institutions. He writes, “…human rights are 
activated only through the emergence of social institutions. Where such institutions are 
lacking, human rights are merely latent and human rights violations cannot exist at all.” 
(Pogge 1992, p. 51). From the reading we can understand that Pogge sees human rights as 
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a function of institutions. To understand Pogge’s concept of human rights (as a function 
of institutions) better, let us consider the following example. I have a right for security, 
healthcare, and other goods and services that an institution can provide. From Pogge’s 
understanding of human rights follows that I do not have a right for these goods and 
services (what interactionalists would say), but I have a right to participate in a system 
which would secure my access to these goods and services.  
The introduction of a new concept of human rights assists Pogge with his attempt to 
develop a new view on the duties that human rights entail. In turn, it serves Pogge’s goal 
to go beyond the libertarian-utilitarian debate about duties in order to broaden the circle 
of responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights without having to affirm positive 
duties (Besson 2003, p. 519).  
In so far, Pogge attempts to show that individuals are (indirectly) responsible for the 
consequences of institutions in which they participate, because they are responsible for 
the shape of institutions which Pogge assumes to be directly responsible for the fulfilment 
of human rights within their structure. And if an institution in which we participate 
doesn’t fulfil human rights, it is our obligation imposed by the negative duty to avoid 
harm in order to reform it. The trick here is that Pogge attempts to activate positive duties 
of individuals (that is, to aid and assist other individuals with the fulfilment of their 
human rights) by appealing only to negative duties (that is, to restrain your own activity 
that could harm human rights of other individuals)4.    
                                                           
4
 Pogge’s understanding of human rights as moral claims and duties attached the rights is justified in the 
following passage, 
 “Consider a human right not to be enslaved. On an interactional view, this right would constrain 
persons, who must not enslave one another. On institutional view, the right would constrain legal and 
economic institutions: slavery must not be permitted or enforced. This leads to an important difference 
regarding the moral role of those who are neither slaves nor slaveholders. On the interactional view, such 
third parts have no responsibility vis-à-vis existing slaves, unless the human right in question involved, 
besides the negative duty not to enslave, also a positive duty to protect or rescue others from 
enslavement. Such positive duties have been notoriously controversial. On the institutional view, by 
contrast, some third parties may be implicated far more directly in the human rights violation. If they are 
not making reasonable efforts toward institutional reform, the more privileged participants in an 
institutional scheme in which slavery is permitted or even enforced – even those who own no slaves 
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This new institutional concept of human rights and duties helps Pogge achieve two 
goals. First, it helps him escape the interactional debate between libertarians and 
utilitarians about duties that human rights impose on individuals. It seems that Pogge has 
found a very subtle approach to duties which is able to balance between libertarianism 
and utilitarianism, satisfying simultaneously both camps of interactionalism. 
Institutionalism seems to be able to satisfy the libertarian camp since it invokes only 
negative duties and doesn’t affirm positive duties. In turn, institutionalism seems to be 
able to satisfy the utilitarian camp by giving them what they want – strong duties to aid 
and assist other individuals with the fulfilment of their rights (Pogge 1992, p. 51). To that 
extent, Pogge’s institutionalism – is a “device” to activate the positive duties of 
individuals by appealing only to their negative duties.   
Second, this approach allows Pogge to broaden the responsibility for the fulfilment of 
human rights without having to affirm positive duties (Pogge 1992, p. 52), and also to 
assume that his cosmopolitan approach leads to a much stronger overall morality (p. 50). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
themselves – are here seen as cooperating in the enslavement, in violation of a negative duty.” (Pogge 
1992, p. 52) 
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Section 4 
CRITICISM TO INSTITUTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
4.1 Introduction 
In the third section of my thesis, I have analyzed how institutional cosmopolitanism of 
Pogge understands human rights and the duties that they entail. I have also explained how 
institutionalism differs from interactionalism and laid out what Pogge’s reasons are to 
develop an alternative vision of human rights and duties. In this section of my thesis, I 
will highlight the criticism to institutional cosmopolitanism. This will be done by raising 
several questions that will construct my critical argument that Pogge’s strategy fails to 
reconcile libertarianism and utilitarianism successfully within his institutional 
cosmopolitanism. 
 The first element of my critical argument will question the institutional understanding 
of the two requirements imposed by negative duties, namely the Harm-Avoidance 
Requirement (that is, a requirement to avoid harm) and the Compensation requirement 
(that is, a requirement to compensate the harm caused). I will argue that interactional 
cosmopolitanism can provide us with better answers to the questions that the two 
requirements impose than Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism does.  
The second element of my critical argument will question the difference between the 
view of institutionalism on duties and the view of any other approach that assumes that 
human rights impose both negative and positive duties on individuals. I will argue that the 
difference is not so big as Pogge claims. I will also lay out some objections of libertarians 
to institutional cosmopolitanism that tend to weaken the position of institutionalism in the 
debate on human rights.  
 
4.2 The Harm-Avoidance and the Compensation Requirement 
The first argument of criticism that I want to underline in my thesis concerns the 
obligations that negatives duties impose on individuals. To recall, the negative duties 
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which the interactional approach assumes impose two obligations (requirements) on 
individuals (Nees 2010, p. 21). First, the obligation to avoid actions that could harm other 
individuals (the Harm-Avoidance Requirement). Second, if we produce a harm to other 
individuals, we are obliged to compensate it sufficiently (the Compensation 
Requirement).  
As we will see from the following reading, the negative duties that Pogge assumes 
within his institutional cosmopolitanism also assume the Harm Avoidance and the 
Compensation Requirement. In Pogge’s book “World Poverty and Human Rights” he 
argues as follows:  
 “(1) One ought not to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably 
leaves human rights unfulfilled (2) without making reasonable efforts to protect its victims and to 
promote institutional reform” (2008, p. 176; numbers added). 
From the first part of the reading (1) we can see that institutional cosmopolitanism 
assigns the responsibility to individuals not to participate in institutions that violate 
human rights. That is the Harm-Avoidance Requirement imposed on individuals by the 
negative duties that institutional cosmopolitanism of Pogge assumes. In the second part of 
the reading (2) we can find the explanation of the Compensation Requirement that 
according to institutionalism appeals to negative duties. That is, to promote institutional 
reform of the institutions that fail to fulfil human rights of other individuals. This is the 
normative component of Pogge’s theory.  
To make it clear, if you participate in an institution which violates human rights, 
following Pogge’s logic, you contribute in some indirect way to the harm caused to the 
rights of other individuals. Hence, you are indirectly responsible for the violations of 
rights of other individuals within the institution. And as far as you contribute to the 
violation of human rights through your participation in an institution, you are obliged to 
compensate the harm caused (since it is your negative duty). What is not clear from the 
institutional theory – is how individuals are supposed to decide whether the Harm-
Avoidance requirement is fulfilled? It seems to be a very subjective part of the theory. 
This is the first problem that concerns the Harm-Avoidance Requirement  
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Another problem in Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism that concerns the Harm-
Avoidance requirement  is that it doesn’t leave a person many options how he can avoid 
actions that could be assumed as a sustain of an institution that violates human rights. 
Actually there are only two alternatives: to become an emigrant or a hermit (Woods 2010, 
pp. 65-66). However, how many people are ready for these two options? Intuitively, we 
can say that the overwhelming majority of people is not ready today to choose any of 
them. What is more, Pogge indirectly affirms that the option of becoming an emigrant 
provides also no feasible solution to how one can escape an institution that violates 
human rights. Pogge presupposes that social cooperation is global and therefore claims 
that the boundaries of institutions go beyond the boundaries of nation-states (1992, p. 52). 
Hence, even if you become an emigrant, you still cannot escape the institution you 
participated in. And also you don’t escape the responsibility for the consequences of the 
institution.  
The other element of my critical argument concerns the Compensation Requirement. 
From the theory it is not evident what kind of compensatory action should be taken in 
order to be able to fulfil the Compensatory Requirement. Pogge writes on the 
compensatory obligation within his institutional cosmopolitanism:  
“Our negative duty not to cooperate in the position of unjust practices, together with our 
continuing participation in an unjust institutional scheme, triggers obligations to promote feasible 
reforms of this scheme that would enhance the fulfilment of human rights” (1992, p. 52). 
Such definition of the obligation seems to be too broad and subjective. Pogge doesn’t 
answer comprehensively the main question “what kind of action should we take in order 
to satisfy the Compensatory requirement?”. He argues, ”Promote feasible reforms” (p. 
52). Hoewever, this is a too broad and indefinite answer. It could be done on numerous 
ways. As a citizen of an unjust state I can go out in the street and promote institutional 
reform via, for example, a civil protest. Or I can write once a year on my Twitter that I am 
against violations of human rights in my country and I would prefer an institutional 
reform. I would promote institutional reform in both cases. But do I fulfil the 
Compensatory Requirement in both cases? And in which situations? The problem here is 
that institutionalism doesn’t propose any metrics that could help us to measure adequately 
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my contribution to the violations that have been done under a global institutional scheme 
(Nees 2010, pp. 24-25). Hence, it is also impossible to mach up my contribution to the 
harm caused with the compensation I offer.  
In contrast to institutionalism, interactionalism provides a clear answer to this 
problem. According to the interactional understanding of the Compensatory Requirement, 
if I produce a particular amount of harm to an actor(s), I should compensate this actor(s) 
with at least the same amount of bonuses (Nees 2010, p. 23). For instance, we study 
together at the same class and I have stolen 100 euro from you. Following the 
interactional understanding of the principle, I should pay you at least 100 euro back in 
order to be able to fulfil the Compensatory Requirement. This is a very clear and definite 
answer. However, institutionalism cannot provide us with such a clear and definite 
answer. Institutionalism doesn’t assign direct responsibility to individuals. Therefore, 
following the institutional logic, it would be the class (not me) who is directly responsible 
for the violation of your right (the right for property in our case), and I would only be 
responsible for the violation of your right indirectly, because I share the responsibility 
with the rest of the class (because we all participate in the same institution which is 
directly responsible for the violation of rights).  
As far as it is the class who is directly responsible for the violation of your right, then 
the whole class is to be responsible for the compensation of the harm caused to you. And 
it is absolutely untransparent from the theory how the compensation should be provided 
and in what amount. Should each member of the class give you 5 euro? Or should I pay 
you 100 euro back, and would it be the responsibility of the class to kick me out of the 
class? Or should the whole class say just sorry to you without any kind of further 
compensation? My point here is that it is debatable how the Compensatory Requirement 
should be fulfilled following the institutional approach, while the interactional approach 
can indeed provide us with a transparent and definite answer. 
So far, the institutional approach to human rights and duties that they entail doesn’t 
provide any clear answer to the question how an individual can practically fulfil the 
Harm-Avoidance requirement to avoid institutions that cause violations of human rights 
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(that is, if we assume that the answer “to become a hermit” is not a good answer at all). It 
also doesn’t provide any definite answer to the question how an individual can measure 
his contribution to the harm caused, or how an individual can match up his contribution 
to the caused harm with the compensation that he offers. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the duties that institutionalism assumes are predominantly indeterminate, while the duties 
that interactionalism assumes are transparent and determinate.   
 
4.3 How Pogge’s View on the Duties Differs From That of Utilitarians  
To recall, Pogge introduced a new concept of human rights in order to be able to find 
an intermediate position between libertarianism (according to which we only have 
negative duites) and utilitarianism (according to which we have both negative and 
positive duties; Pogge 1992, p. 51). It is Pogge’s strategy to activate positive duties 
appealing only to negative duties; he tries to support the utilitarian list of human rights 
without having to affirm positive duties. The aim of my critical argument here is to show 
that Pogge doesn’t succeed to do this. In order to show it, it is necessary to make some 
conceptual points.  
Pogge acknowledges only negative duties and doesn’t affirm  positive duties. What I 
want to show now, is that the conceptual position of Pogge doesn’t differ from the 
conceptual position of someone who claims that we have both negative and positive 
duties (i.e. shares the utilitarian position regarding the duties that human rights entail). 
Therefore, it is possible to make a distinction between what we would call “libertarian 
(Poggean) institutional cosmopolitanism” on the one hand, and “utilitarian institutional 
cosmopolitanism” on the other hand5. Libertarian institutional cosmopolitanism would 
assume that human rights impose only negative duties on individuals which are sufficient 
to produce some positive obligations (Pogge 1992, p. 52). Utilitarian institutional 
                                                           
5
 John Rawls in his book “A Theory of Justice” (1971) develops an approach which seems to look like 
what we would call “Utilitarian Institutional cosmopolitanism”. He assumes a duty to reform unjust 
institutions as Pogge it does, while also recognizing a list of some positive duties. 
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cosmopolitanism would assume that we have negative duties that oblige us not to 
participate in institutions that avoidably leave human rights unfulfilled, and also have 
positive duties that oblige us to aid and assist other individuals with the fulfilment of their 
rights if we don’t have to sacrifice something of great moral significance (Nees 2010, p. 
27). In section 4.2 of my thesis I have argued that the negative duties that Pogge appeals 
to within his institutional cosmopolitanism are quite indeterminate. And as far as it is not 
obvious enough from the theory of institutionalism what kind of obligations negative 
duties entail, it is difficult to distinguish the Poggean version of institutional 
cosmopolitanism from what we would call a utilitarian institutional cosmopolitanism. As 
the negative duties within the Poggean version of institutionalism are not specified, they 
can include all the duties that a utilitarian institutionalism would assign to individuals as 
positive duties. Hence, there is no big difference between Poggean institutionalism, which 
unsuccessfully tries to affirm negative duties only, and utilitarian institutionalism, which 
recognizes both negative and positive duties. 
My main argument here is that Pogge doesn’t succeed in his goal to use the libertarian 
position on the duties to justify the list of rights and duties of utilitarians. Actually, he 
fails to convince us that his position differs much from the position that asserts that 
individuals have both negative and positive duties. To that extent, he fails in his main 
goal to prove that we have strong obligations to assist other individuals with the 
fulfilment of their rights by appealing only to negative duties.  
 
4.4 Direct and Indirect Responsibility  
As was noted, Pogge argues that his institutional cosmopolitanism broadens the 
responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights (1992, p. 52). He attempts to do so by 
going beyond simple libertarianism (p. 51). He assigns direct responsibility for the 
violation of human rights to institutions, and indirect responsibility to all participants who 
participate in those institutional schemes, trying no to affirm positive duties. Then, Pogge 
explains his success to do this by accentuating that he found “an intermediate position” 
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between libertarianism and utilitarianism (2008, p. 177). However, then the question that 
arises – what does Pogge understand with “an intermediate position” between 
libertarianism and utilitarianism?  
On my understanding of “an intermediate position”, it is a position which is 
intermediate in terms of causal relation between an individual’s action and a harm caused. 
To recall, on the libertarian view there should be a direct relation between X’s action and 
Y’s harm, in order to be able to impose some duties on X (see section 2.2). On the 
utilitarian view, such a causal relation is not necessary to be able to ground duties. Thus, 
an intermediate position between libertarianism and utilitarianism would assume a 
position which would be somewhere in-between a libertarian and a utilitarian position in 
terms of their understanding of the relation between X’s action and Y’s harm necessary to 
impose some obligations on X.  
In contrast to my view, Pogge believes his position is intermediate, because he thinks 
that an indirect relation between X’s action and the harm caused to Y – is a sufficient 
condition to be able to held X responsible for the harm caused to Y. The criticism from 
libertarians would be that indirect causal relation is generally insufficient to be able to 
hold X responsible for the harm of Y, because it seems to be no causal relation at all. 
Indirect relation enables Pogge to trace a relation between the X’s action and the harm 
caused to Y almost in all cases, even where libertarians would not find the relation. 
Hence, it can be concluded that Pogge shares more the position of utilitarians who 
assume that no causal relation is necessary for generating duties, than the position of 
libertarians who assume that a causal relation is a necessary condition for grounding of 
duties.  
 
4.5 Voluntariness and Responsibility 
Apparently, Pogge’s version of institutional cosmopolitanism seems to function 
properly only in a system where we would be able to choose voluntary institutions in 
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which we may participate6. Then we would be able to meet the Harm-Avoidance 
Obligation leaving institutions that don’t fulfil human rights. Unfortunately, the existing 
system of nation-states doesn’t provide us with such possibility. We are prescribed to be a 
member of a state (normally) simply by the place of our birth. Hence, following the 
concept of institutional cosmopolitanism of Pogge, we are all prescribed to be guilty of 
violating human rights in our country. What is more, because of the interconnectedness of 
the world we seem to be responsible for violations of human rights not only in our 
country, but in the whole world, because we are all members of one global institution. 
As Buchanan rightfully claimed, however, responsibility requires voluntariness (2004, 
p. 95). If we cannot prove that individual X made action Y on a voluntary basis, we can’t 
held individual X responsible for the action Y. And actually, individuals’ participation in 
the global structure of the world doesn’t seem to be voluntary (Buchanan 2004, p. 95). 
Therefore, we cannot assign responsibility for the consequences of the structure to 
individuals who non-voluntarily participate in it. To that extent, institutionalism indeed 
fails to assign the responsibility to individuals for violation of human rights  caused by 
institutions which people don’t choose for on a voluntary basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6
 Only if we don’t assume that all institutions are imperfect and sometimes violate human rights. If we 
assume that all institutions are imperfect, than it seems that we are unable to escape the responsibility for 
violation of human rights at all. 
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Section 5 
SUGGESTIONS TO INSTITUTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous part of my thesis was dedicated to the criticism to institutional 
cosmopolitanism. I indicated that institutional cosmopolitanism does not provide any 
clear answer to the question how individuals can fulfil the obligations imposed on them 
by negative duties, namely the Harm-Avoidance Requirement and the Compensation 
Requirement. Institutionalism also seems to leave individuals with not so many options 
how they can avoid actions that could be assumed as a sustain of an institution that 
violates human rights. Another problem within institutional cosmopolitanism that I have 
tried to explain is that it doesn’t differ much from the position of utilitarians who believe 
that we have both negative and positive duties. As we found, Pogge attempts to show that 
affirmation of positive duties is not necessary to be able to broaden the individuals’ 
responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights.  Evidently, the main problem within the 
institutional theory of Pogge is that the theory does not specify the requirements that 
negative duties entail.  
This part of my thesis will address the criticism to institutional cosmopolitanism. I 
will attempt to refute the main objections to institutionalism by suggesting the Least 
Harm Principle. The Least Harm Principle implies that we should always choose an 
action from a range of actions which produce the least harm to other individuals. In this 
section, I will lay out the concept of the Least Harm Principle and observe how it 
responds to the criticism to institutionalism.  
5.2 The Least Harm Principle 
As was noted in the previous section of my thesis, one of the essential problems in the 
theory of institutional cosmopolitanism is that it doesn’t specify the obligations that 
negative duties impose on individuals. To be sure, the first step to improve the theory 
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would be a precise specification of the obligations. A viable way how we can specify the 
obligations – is to introduce the Least Harm Principle (Nees 2010, pp. 29-34). 
The Least Harm principle assumes that when individuals are faced with a range of 
choices between various actions, we are morally obliged to make a choice that would 
produce the least harm to other individuals. In order to understand the principle better, let 
us consider the following situation. You want to buy a car and you should choose between 
two models: one is a normal car, and one is environment-friendly. According to the Least 
Harm Principle you have a moral obligation to choose the environmentally-friendly car, 
because it produces less harm to the environment in comparison to the normal car. 
The Least Harm principle  has several advantages in respect to institutional 
cosmopolitanism. First, it allows to address the major problem of institutionalism which 
is indeterminacy of negative duties: it allows to specify the obligations imposed by 
negatives duties. The Least Harm Principle will make it relatively clear how individuals 
should assume whether the Harm-Avoidance Requirement is fulfilled or not. If one 
chooses an action or a course of actions that produces the least harm to other individuals 
– one does fulfil the Harm-Avoidance Requirement.  
Second, the Least Harm Principle will leave individuals with much more space to 
avoid any indirect harming of rights of other individuals in comparison to a simple 
version of institutionalism that Pogge assumes. As I have argued in the previous section 
of my thesis, Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism leaves individuals only with two 
options how individuals can avoid actions that could be assumed as a sustain of an 
institution which violates human rights; either to become an emigrant or a hermit7. What 
is more, if we assume that all institutions are imperfect (will not always fulfil all rights of 
                                                           
7
 As I have argued in the section 4.2 of my thesis, the option to become an immigrant is not a good option. 
It doesn’t escape individuals from the responsibility for the harms caused by an institution as far as Pogge 
assumes that institutions go beyond the system of nation-states. Hence, Pogge leaves individuals actually 
with only one option – to become a hermit.  
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all individuals), then participation in an institution is a  guilt by itself. Consequently, one 
should become a hermit who doesn’t participate in any institution. And intuitively we can 
say that there are not so many people who are open for this ultra-radical option.  
In turn, the Least Harm Principle provides institutionalism with a solution. It provides 
individuals with many options how they can satisfy the Harm-Avoidance Requirement, 
without actually having to emigrate or becoming a hermit. The principle directly 
addresses the problems which individuals face each day in their interactions with the 
global world, what makes it highly practical and useful. Do you want to buy a car? 
Choose a car which does the least harm to environment! Do you decide which political 
party you should vote for? Vote for a party that provides the most support for human 
rights! And so on. As a matter of fact, the Least Harm Principle generates a good moral 
guidance for individuals in almost all everyday decisions.  
Third, the Least Harm Principle perfectly suits Pogge’s idea about a system with a 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty, where individuals could choose institutions where they 
want to participate (1992, p. 58), while also being applicable in the existing system of 
nation-states. This makes the Least Harm Principle realistic and practical in use. The 
Least Harm Principle also provides a good response to the critique of Buchanan (2004) to 
Pogge. To recall, Buchanan criticises Pogge that we cannot be responsible for the 
consequences of the global structure because we don’t participate voluntary in the global 
structure, and responsibility requires voluntariness (p. 95).  
The Least Harm Principle leaves individuals enough space in their each day-choices 
to be able to assume their voluntariness. Even if we don’t have a choice whether to 
participate in the global structure or not, we are still volunteers in our decisions for what 
party to vote, what products to buy, what organizations to support, etc. The Least Harm 
Principle proposes an intermediate position between Buchanan’s and Pogge’s views on 
individuals’ responsibility. It keeps individuals responsible for making choices that would 
produce the least harm. Individuals are asked by the Least Harm Principle to be 
responsible not for all consequential harms of the global structure (if we would do so, we 
would go way too far in our assumption of the responsibility). The Least Harm Principle 
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requires from individuals not less or more –  to minimize the harms of the structure they 
participate in. It seems to be just and realistic. And it doesn’t require from individuals to 
eliminate all evils of the global structure what in practice seems to be impossible.   
Of course, the objection that can be made here is –  if I commit the least harm, I’m 
still guilty for committing a harm. Hence, I cannot meet the Harm-Avoidance 
Requirement imposed by negative duties. The response to the criticism will be that some 
choices that we make when interacting with the global world – are not choices at all (in 
the moral sense). We cannot choose, for example, to drink water, or not, or to eat, or to 
die from starving. Evidently, we are not morally responsible for this kind of questions. 
But we can choose products that we buy, organization that we support, political parties 
that we vote for, and so on. In fact, these are real choices in the moral sense. And we are 
morally responsible for this kind of choices.  
The other obvious objection to the Least Harm Principle can be that in many cases we 
don’t know a-priori  which action from a range of actions will produce the least harm. 
Often, we can discover it only a-posteriori. I absolutely agree with this criticism, as 
individuals can never calculate all possible outcomes and consequences of their actions. 
Therefore, individuals can be morally responsible only for the intended outcomes and the 
assumed consequences of the outcomes. If I sell herrings on a market and one of my 
customers would die because I had sold him a fish and he choked on a fish bone, I cannot 
be held responsible for his death, because I could not have assumed his death. I could be 
held responsible only in a situation where I had sold him an infected fish, or because I had 
done it on purpose, or because I had not taken any preventive action (for example, by 
checking my fish whether it was fresh before I would sell it to people). On basis of this, I 
believe that the Least Harm Principle still stands the critic.   
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CONCLUSION 
In the first four sections of my thesis, I have underlined a number of weak points in 
the theory of institutional cosmopolitanism of Pogge regarding the duties that human 
rights entail. In my criticism of the theory I have argued that Pogge’s vision of 
institutionalism has definite difficulties with the specification of negative duties. As a 
consequences, the theory cannot answer clearly such questions as how the Harm-
Avoidance or the Compensation Requirement can be met within the theory of 
institutionalism. I have also observed  that Pogge is not convincing enough in his 
arguments to be able to show that his appeal to negative duties is sufficient to broaden the 
responsibility for certain abuses of human rights. This gives reason to conclude that 
Pogge’s attempt to reconcile the libertarian and the utilitarian view on duties within his 
institutional cosmopolitanism – fails. Hence, it may be concluded that Pogge doesn’t 
succeed in achieving his primary goal – to convince the public that we have strong 
obligations toward other individuals to aid and assist them with the fulfilment of their 
human rights.  
 In the previous analyses, I have responded to the criticism to institutionalism by 
introducing the Least Harm Principle. My conclusion is that the Least Harm Principle 
seems to be an adequate response to the main criticism to institutional cosmopolitanism. 
It definitely helps to specify the negative duties and solve the problems associated with 
the lack of the specification of the duties. In fact, the Least-Harm Principle can assist the 
theory of institutional cosmopolitanism by answering to such questions as how the Harm-
Avoidance and the Compensatory Requirements should be fulfilled within the 
institutional version of cosmopolitanism, and also how individuals can be responsible for 
the consequences of a system that they don’t choose voluntary to participate in. In sum, I 
conclude that the Least Harm Principle is able to eliminate many weak points in the 
theory of institutionalism and to significantly strengthen its position within the fascinating 
debate on global justice and the promotion of human rights.   
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